ABSTRACT ▪ Despite the scholarly attention devoted to the European Employment Strategy (EES), its policy content remains elusive. This article first explores the ways in which the 'open method of coordination', which departs from traditional regulatory approaches, tends to 'depoliticize' the issue of employment, fashioning its discourse in an apparently technical language. This constitutes a serious shortcoming. There follows a systematic analysis of Greek experience, which shows that the analytical template of 'Eurosclerosis' used for assessing and combating unemployment is based on false premises. This orthodoxy attributes unemployment to high wages and an expensive welfare state; but Greece is a low-productivity economy with an ineffective welfare state, relying almost exclusively on low wages and social transfers. Failure to come to terms with this reality hampers both the appropriateness of EU recommendations and the Greek government's capacity to deal with unemployment.
Introduction
It is no secret that unemployment is a serious problem in Greece. Despite optimistic projections and ebullient rhetoric about a recent economic miracle, unemployment has become a structural feature of the Greek labour market, indeed, of social life as a whole. In 2001, it stood at 10.5 percent -the highest in the EU apart from Spain (10.6 percent), and within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) otherwise below only Slovakia (18.8 percent) and Poland (16.1 percent) experienced higher levels. Particularly worrying, and casting a continually heavy shadow on social cohesion, have been the resilience of long-term unemployment (at 6.1 percent, the second highest in the EU) and the fact that, in contrast to all the other EU countries, the proportion of households with no employed member has been increasing. While EU15 registered a 10.3 percent decline in 1999 (the last year for which comparable data are available), in Greece the figure rose by 8.5 percent (Eurostat, , 2002 OECD, 2001) .
Employment policy is thus obviously critical, perhaps the single most crucial aspect of national public policy. But the importance of the topic transcends Greece. Pondering over features of the Greek experience allows one to question central tenets of contemporary policies towards unemployment in the EU, in particular, the nature and prospects of the European Employment Strategy (EES).
This article attempts a critical examination of the EES in the light of Greek experience. In my discussion, I first examine the strategy's main features, its innovative aspects as well as its limitations. In particular, I will suggest that the tendency for the EES to depoliticize the issue of employment (considered by some to be its main asset) may well turn out to be its most serious shortcoming. The second part turns to a more systematic analysis of the Greek case. I argue that the supply-side manner in which the problem of unemployment has been framed by the EES leads Greek policy-making away from the real roots of the problem to arenas that run the risk of being at best minimally beneficial and at worst outright damaging.
The Open Method of Coordination and the European Employment Strategy: Policy without Politics?
The early 1990s were a gloomy time for the EU, with low rates of economic growth, declining legitimacy for most European institutions, and a jobless rate not seen since the 1930s. It was during this conjuncture that a distinct EES was initiated.
The traditional reluctance of Member States to cede social policy competence to supranational bodies had long rendered the 'strong' version of 'Social Europe' envisaged by the Delors administration chimerical (Gold et al., 2000) . But the problem was not exclusively one of limited mandate. Given the 'great diversity of policies and practices within Europe and the deep embeddedness of social policy in unique national institutions', the task of formulating comprehensive employment policies appeared daunting (Trubeck and Mosher, 2001: 6) . The EES is the product of this particular crystallization of factors: a response to a visible policy gap, albeit in a manner aspiring to overcome the limits of, and resistance to, the traditional regulatory approach.
Evolving by successive approximations and over a period of time, the EES was also the product of an important strategic compromise. The first landmark was the Essen European Council (December 1994) , where the clash between proponents of EU-level regulation and those who favoured limiting EU jurisdiction was averted thanks to the adoption of 'minimalist', non-mandatory recommendations. Member States were invited to adopt multi-year employment strategies pivoting on active labour market policies, a process that was to be monitored by the Commission and the Council of Ministers (Goetschy, 1999: 121-2) . After Essen, however, employment in Europe took a turn for the worse. By the time of the Amsterdam Council in June 1997, it had become clear that the 'Essen process' was in need of serious supplementing.
Reaching consensus was once again difficult. The new compromise involved an adaptation of the multilateral surveillance process that had been developed in the run-up to monetary union (Gill et al., 1999) . The plan formally giving birth to the EES took its final form at the Extraordinary Luxembourg Jobs Summit (November 1997), and consisted in the adoption of 19 policy guidelines organized into four pillars: employability (promoting skill development through active labour market policies); entrepreneurship (policies to reduce non-wage labour costs, especially for low-wage workers and for small and medium-sized enterprises); adaptability (promoting flexibilization); and equal opportunity policies intended to improve opportunities for women. Each year, beginning in 1998, Member States have been required to formulate and submit to the Commission and the Council 'National Action Plans' (NAPs) on employment on the basis of these guidelines (and pillars). After an evaluation, the Council addresses recommendations to the Member States. Though not formally mandatory, these are obviously symbolically constraining ('soft law') (Goetschy, 1999 (Goetschy, , 2000 (Goetschy, , 2001 .
Since the Lisbon Council (March 2000), the EES has also been referred to as the 'open method of coordination' (OMC), a term intended to distinguish it from the traditional, legally binding regulatory approach (Goetschy, 2001: 405-6) . One major new development has been the introduction of four cross-cutting general prescriptions ('horizontal objectives') intended to capture the strategy's essential intentions: (A) maximizing employment rates; (B) promoting education and lifelong learning; (C) institutionalizing the deliberation of the 'social partners'; and (D) ensuring the coherence of measures proposed under the four pillars ('policy mix'). In 2002, the process entered its fifth round, undoubtedly a sign of its general stability as a policy format (Gold et al., 2000) . A comprehensive evaluation of the strategy was launched by the Commission in July 2002 and is expected to be concluded before the end of 2003.
Public policy scholarship has been quick to emphasize the neovoluntarist distinctiveness of the new approach qua governance process, combining EU-level competence and subsidiarity. The literature has emphasized that it is iterative, comprehensive, open to the intervention of a plurality of social actors, and positively ingenious in its synthesizing (positive-sum) capacities, promoting convergence while allowing divergence. Scholars have argued that the OMC represents a 'revolution of democratic governance', and have praised its unique capacity to reconfigure policy networks, encourage decentralized experimentation and produce learning and innovation (Ardy and Begg, 2001; Rhodes et al., 2001; Sabel, 2000; Teague, 2001) , while Goetschy (2001: 403) observed that the EES 'is a way to "depoliticize" the unemployment problem from its immediate national constraints and to address it in a longer-term perspective'.
These, of course, are exceptional qualities: Europeanizing without harmonizing, promoting policies without legislating, and tackling controversial matters without stumbling on controversy -a model of public policy without the irksomeness of contentious politics. The processual novelty is indisputable, but so appears to be the penchant of some scholars to get carried away. The four EES pillars and 19 or so guidelines as well as the four horizontal objectives are organizing devices, but (obviously) they are also substantive policy containers, both delimiting the employment field and slicing it into operationally functional categories. The undeniable 'openness' 1 of the OMC is thus premised on the configurative 'closure' of the substantive political agenda underpinning it. As Schmitter (2001: 8) has recently stressed, 'the idea that . . . "recommendations for good governance" are apolitical and have nothing to do with "interfering in the domestic politics of Member States" ' is illusory.
Analysis of the EES policy content is therefore imperative. According to Trubeck and Mosher, the EES: bears traces of a compromise between more traditional Social Democratic views and 'Blairite' ideas of a 'Third Way'. The stress on working, flexibility, and the role of entrepreneurship in creating jobs embodies the Third Way emphasis on overcoming dependency and shows acceptance of the need to . . . adapt social protection to the need by business for flexibility. Nonetheless, the guidelines foresee an important role for the state and for the social partners: they presume that the core of the welfare state will remain in force and do not envision major changes in the organization of industrial relations. The strategy is one of reform and recalibration, not major restructuring. (2001: 14, emphasis added) The description is lucid as far as the formal structure of EES objectives is concerned (what may be dubbed its phenomenology), but (except perhaps for the last sentence) somewhat thin when it comes to deciphering its inmost political nature (its ontology). For purposes of assessing the political significance of the EES, however, the latter is obviously critical, even if somewhat peripheral to the core concerns of mainstream public policy scholarship.
One bold way of tackling this problem has been suggested by Visser (2000) , who, apparently disagreeing with the view that the EES represents
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mere 'recalibration', claims that the new strategic thinking may well be envisaged as contributing to the ongoing undermining of 'social citizenship' in T.H. Marshall's sense. Streeck (1987) noted the beginnings of this process in a classic article, where he observed a dedifferentiation (at the time still emergent) of social and employment policy, on the one hand, and economic policy on the other. While in the first postwar decades, the former emerged as a distinct sphere seeking to 'offset the inequalities of income and power produced by the latter' (Regini, 2000: 12) , in the 1980s and 1990s, the trend has been towards dismantling the 'barriers that have served to insulate labour relations and social policy from concerns for, and changes in, economic performance' (Visser, 2000: 422) . Accordingly, the goal of social and employment policy ceases to be protecting individuals from the market, but (in a human resource management vein) to 'empower' them within it. Streeck (1999) terms this trend 'supply-side egalitarianism', and suggests that the new compound of social employment and economic policy is, essentially, economic as social policy (see also Ashiagbor, 2001) .
Extending and amplifying the same problématique, albeit from a complementary industrial relations angle, Hyman (2001: 281) suggests that the current 'Europeanization' of labour markets runs contrary to the historic tendency of employment regimes to 'ensure that the employer-employee relationship is not primarily determined by market forces'. According to Hyman, this involves disembedding marketgoverned decision-making from the norms of moral economy: a state of affairs in which, to remember Polanyi's (1944: 57) classic formulation, 'instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system'.
From these two dimensions of substantive change, however, flows a consequential third, which I think requires stressing. Unlike its 'socialpolicy-embedded' predecessors, EES thinking avidly hypostatizes (or reifies) 'the market' (and the productive regime in which it is embedded), whose impulses are now elevated to the status of the definitive policyvaluation benchmark: whether a particular policy measure is good or bad depends on whether or not it is responsive to market impulses. An obvious, but equally crucial, upshot is that no similar evaluation is possible for 'the market' qua productive regime: by definition, valuation standards are not there to be evaluated.
The typically 'Third Way' rhetoric propagating (but often also concealing) these changes has been brave and precocious, especially in the latest, post-Lisbon (March 2000) Council meetings where the goal of full employment has been adopted. 2 The theoretical reasoning behind such changes, however, is not free of vexing internal contradictions. Two obvious questions are seldom, if ever, asked by EU policy-makers (or by scholars). First, what was it that caused the need for a special social citizenship and market embeddedness in the first place? The answer is painfully obvious: market failure, the fact that unfettered market operation has been found historically unable to protect societies from high unemployment, social crisis and political alienation. From that flows the second query: Has the new, 'globalized', economic environment changed that? For, clearly, a prerequisite for a policy of 'individual empowerment' (no matter how preferable to mere 'negative flexibility') to be effective in the long run is a market that does not fail. Otherwise the problem remains, or is at best recycled, no matter how 'empowered' the individuals or how 'equal the opportunities' (compare Sihto, 2001) . Once again, the answer is simple: not only has the prospect of market failure not disappeared, in fact, it has become more likely (Gray, 1999) . This is not to suggest that the EES is a purely neo-classical approach (especially after Lisbon). But the difference is not that it instils social principles in the operation of the market, as 'Third Way' social democracy is fond of arguing. What is distinctive about the EES is processual novelty, but for the purposes of recommodifying and remarketizing the employment relationship. That this deeply political choice is hidden from view (and blocked off the agenda) creates a situation where 'consultation' and OMC deliberation between Member States and the (still contending) 'social partners' retain a perpetually asymptotic relation to what may be the gist of the policy debate: unemployment as a problem of the impasse of particular production regimes (as culturally sanctioned bundles of social institutions). The EES may thus be brilliantly iterative and 'open' as a formal governance process, but the stiflingly supply-side framing of the debate it inaugurates suffers from what social science methodologists call the premature closure fallacy (Sartori, 1985) : the tendency to freeze the analytical categories of a debate in a manner that ultimately hampers its dynamics. Horizontal objective C of the 'Lisbon approach' invites the 'social partners' to engage in 'social dialogue' far and wide, but the market-reifying decision premises of the pillars and guidelines are not to be questioned. In the following section, I will suggest that this begets problems, especially for countries with low-cost, low-productivity production regimes such as Greece.
The Greek Experience: Innovation or Old Wine in New Bottles?
A catchword of the 1980s and 1990s was 'Eurosclerosis': a sweeping generality purporting to explain Europe's unfavourable economic performance. Its contours are easy to summarize: European unemployment reflected an impasse caused by inordinately expensive welfare states, high labour costs and social wages, and rigid labour markets. But as Marx used to say, to formulate a question is to resolve it. Perceiving the problem of unemployment through the lens of 'Eurosclerosis' also lay the grounds for a particular policy to deal with it. Despite variation, this involved moderating labour costs, cutting the social wage, and dismantling employment protection (flexibility). This would unleash the employment-creation potential of the economy, now expected to be higher among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Though much has changed since the first crude versions of 'Eurosclerosis' were introduced (Abraham, 1999; Koutsiaras, 2001; Nickell, 1997) , its affinities with core supply-side features of the EES are not difficult to detect. Schematically, the relationships are as follows. Reductions in the social wage (indirect labour costs in the form of social security contributions) and increased flexibility are the stuff of entrepreneurship and adaptability respectively, while equal opportunities (and horizontal objective A) seek, by increasing labour market participation, to offset losses from state revenues caused by promoting entrepreneurship. The substantive novelty is employability, which while aiming at a sufficiently skilled labour force capable of staffing the anticipated 'economies of scope' (in the SME sector), has the added advantage of easing pressures on state expenditure. Active labour market policies are generally cheaper than traditional welfare, while many 'activation' initiatives can be passed on to the private sector. In typically neo-classical manner, it is also assumed that the increased supply of skills will more or less suffice to generate its own demand.
But can Greek unemployment be described as an instance of Eurosclerosis? Tackling this issue from the perspective of labour costs is easy. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, throughout the 1990s Greece (along with Portugal) was not a high-wage economy, but Europe's cellar dweller, with an index of hourly direct pay for production workers less than half that of the EU15 (BLS, 2001 ). In addition, indirect labour costs, though somewhat higher, have been consistently below the EU average (Eurostat, , 2002 , and must in any case be viewed in relation to the extremely low total labour costs. Though it follows that further reductions in indirect labour costs are likely to create little or no employment, such reduction is at the heart of the entrepreneurship pillar and constitutes the core of Commission and Council recommendations to the Greek government.
The issues surrounding flexibility are more intriguing. Greece is usually thought of as a relatively rigid labour market. But recent research has demonstrated that, on several counts, this is largely a myth (Kouzis, 2001: 280-309) . The 'firing rigidity' usually imputed to Greek labour law is exaggerated and affects an exceedingly small percentage of firms. Moreover, flexible labour practices such as 'subsidized short-time work', 'intermittent employment' and 'temporary lay-offs' are quite prevalent, but these are usually overlooked in most statistical and policy documents highlighting Greece's low percentage of part-time work.
Similarly telling is the fact that, in most EU countries, workers who usually or actually work for less than 35 hours a week are automatically reclassified as part-time, even if formally designated as full-time. In Greece, the procedure is different; an OECD study disclosed that in 1995 nearly 9 percent of all designated 'full-time workers' worked less than 35 hours (Van Bastelaer et al., 1997: 8, 32) . Evidently, this must be borne in mind when passing judgement on Greece's relatively low percentage of part-time work.
All things considered, it seems that far from being excessively rigid, the Greek labour market has displayed a variety of flexible forms. But the promise of flexibility for countries such as Greece cannot be fully assessed unless one takes into account the work arrangement that is flexible in extremis, that is, informal work. According to a study released by researchers at the University of Linz in early 2002, Greece ranks first within the OECD in this regard, with 28.7 percent of GDP in 1999/2000 produced informally. Three out of the four countries leading the informality table (Greece, Italy, and Spain) are also at the top of the unemployment chart.
Moreover, the extreme flexibility associated with informal activities invariably fails to generate productivity-enhancing 'economies of scope', relying almost exclusively on low production and management costs. In the early 1990s, far from offering a way out of the employment crisis of the official economy, informal work was in the midst of a severe crisis of its own, with anything between 30 percent and 40 percent of the informal establishments founded in the 1980s closing down (Hadjimihalis and Vaiou, 1997; Lyberaki, 1988; Pelagidis, 1997) . Undoubtedly, new informal ventures have been launched since, relying in part on a large pool of undocumented economic immigrants (UEIs). But there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that their contribution to the goal of raising productivity will be any different from that of their predecessors of the 1980s and early 1990s. As Fakiolas has stressed in a recent review of the effects of UEI inflow in Greece, by staffing informal ventures and restricting increases in real wages, this 'may have diminished the efforts to increase capital investment and economic restructuring ' (1999: 211) .
Informal work qua extreme flexibility in Greece (and other southern European countries) has been found to be associated not with increased productivity and employment potential, but their exact opposite. This may sit quite uncomfortably with the 'Eurosclerosis' template of the EES, but concerned scholars and policy-makers have a serious duty to break loose from 'flexibility-reifying sclerosis'.
Informality, however, avails itself not only as a laboratory for assessing the promise of flexibility, but also for assessing the promise of self-employment and SMEs (two other EES policy totems). EES entrepreneurship pillar recommendations addressed to Greece rarely suggest SME creation, as Greece leads the OECD charts of the self-employed as a percentage of the economically active. Indeed, in its 2001 report Competitiveness, Innovation and Enterprise Performance, the Commission celebrates the fact that over the past few years more and more people in Europe 'choose [sic] self-employment over dependent employment', simply lamenting that 'only in Greece and Portugal the population . . . shows a propensity towards self-employment comparable to that of the US'. 3 What is not mentioned, however, is that the next two countries in the OECD self-employment charts are Turkey and Mexico, hardly economic success stories.
But the perennially low productivity and low sustainable employment creation potential of SMEs is no secret to serious students of Greece. In its 1996 Economic Survey, the OECD (1996: 10) gave a fine description of the SME and self-employment phenomenon:
Self-employment and employment in family enterprises act as a safety net against unemployment. Every year thousands of small new enterprises are created by people who cannot find other employment. However, in many cases, after a few months these enterprises are forced to close down or are sold to other aspirant entrepreneurs. Moschonas and Droucopoulos (1993: 116, 118 ) discovered that in the period 1963-90, the productivity gap between large (presumably 'rigid') and small (invariably 'flexible') establishments widened by no less than 25 percent, while the 1996 Community Innovation Survey (CIS) ranked Greek SMEs absolutely last in Europe in terms of their 'in-house innovating' (Greece being the only country in the EU with an average rate 20 percent below the EU mean). Naturally, the gap has also been widening in terms of wages. While in 1963 the annual remuneration per employee in flexible SMEs was 75.9 percent of that in large establishments, by 1990 it had fallen to 67.1 percent. None of this has helped Greece avoid the eruption of unemployment in the course of the 1990s. Like so much else in EES thinking, the promise of flexible SMEs as a solution to unemployment is doubtful to say the least (compare Spanos et al., 2001) .
The preceding analysis clearly shows, then, that the 'Eurosclerosis' analytical template used for assessing and combating Greek unemployment is based on false premises. Far from being a high-wage economy with an expensive welfare state, Greece has been the exact opposite: a lowproductivity economy with an utterly ineffective welfare state, relying almost exclusively on low wages and social transfers (Kritsantonis, 1992; Petmesidou, 1996) . Failure to come to terms with this reality hampers both the appropriateness of EU recommendations and the Greek government's capacity to deal effectively with unemployment, no matter what the 'policy mix'. High unemployment is not an instance of the exhaustion of 'Fordist welfarism', but of the impasses of the Greek economypolity constellation qua production regime. Huber and Stephens (1999: 2) conceptualize 'production regimes' as configurations of institutions and policies. The 'relevant institutions are private and public enterprises (industrial and financial), associations of capital interests (business associations and employers' organizations) and of labour, labour market institutions, and governmental agencies involved in economic policy-making'. Attention must also be paid to these institutions' patterns of interaction. The literature on 'production regimes' (or 'varieties of capitalism') is burgeoning (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hollingsworth et al., 1993) , but Greece is never discussed, not least because it escapes easy categorization along either the lines of Esping-Andersen's (1990) famous threefold classification of 'welfare state regimes' or Soskice's (1999) general distinction between coordinated (social) and uncoordinated (liberal) production regimes.
Obviously, this is not the place to analyse the Greek production regime in any meaningful detail. What must be stressed, however, is that such analysis is an absolute prerequisite of (and must inform) all employment policy. Otherwise, policy-making runs the risk of falling victim to what economists call the paradox of the 'theory of the second best'. According to this, environmental imperfections (or what I would prefer to describe as production-regime constraints) cause a policy which may have been first-best in a congruent environment to worsen, instead of improve, labour market efficiency (Adnett, 1996: 86) . A couple of examples must suffice to demonstrate why this is so.
Unless private firms change their historically adventurist entrepreneurial orientation (seeking short-term profits without any productivityenhancing investment in research and development and strategic capital deepening), the success of equal opportunities and horizontal objective A (both seeking to increase labour market participation) may well end up increasing rather than reducing unemployment (Karakatsanis, 2000) . Similarly, unless employer behaviour changes, employability policies may simply raise the skill level of the unemployed. As argued above, active labour market policies, though welcome, hardly guarantee employment creation.
Unless there is an altogether different synergy between state and private capital in fields such as the observance of labour law and employment promotion, increased flexibility will not reduce unemployment, it will only accentuate productivity retardation and the kind of private capital adventurism that is so prevalent in Greece. The exact nature of the latter enters public policy discourse only sporadically, whenever the body of Labour Inspectors (severely short-staffed since being created in 1998) carry out their inspections. The most recent (conducted in July and October 2001) found 50 percent of firms inspected systematically breaking the law. In their July Report, the Labour Inspectors also disclosed that the much publicized (and praised) private network of 50 employment-promotion centres was utterly corrupt and ineffective; 20 centres were forced to close as a result. It is also noteworthy that recent research on vocational training has concluded that the utterly disappointing state of affairs in Greece 'is unlikely to be elucidated by neo-classical approaches focusing on competition' (Patiniotis and Stavroulakis, 1997: 200) . This is neither necessary nor inevitable. Empirical studies have shown a relationship between labour costs and productivity (and employmentcreation potential) that is contrary to that which the EES has tended to elevate to the status of ossified principle: a state of affairs where higher wages and social security contributions can generate better jobs and higher productivity (Huber and Stephens, 1998) . Operating within such a dynamic framework, scholars such as Boyer (1990 Boyer ( , 1993 have claimed that raising the relative price of unskilled labour forces employers to raise both the skill intensity of production and capital-labour ratios, the likely result being both productivity growth and sustained increases in competitiveness. Recent research has indicated that a solidaristic, productivity-oriented wage policy still holds great promise for the future, its many political and institutional prerequisites notwithstanding (Schulten, 2002) . This can serve as a valuable starting point en route to the development of an altogether different production regime: a coherent technological system that will enable cumulative productivity growth to be achieved (Rylmon et al., 1997) .
Conclusion
That Greece is a country combining high unemployment with low labour costs and a large (almost infinitely flexible) informal economy casts serious doubt on the validity of key EES policy presuppositions. If this is so, the premature (and unduly stifling) supply-side framing of unemployment characterizing the EES must be undone. If the Greek experience teaches us anything, it is that problems may persist not because of limited 'coordination', 'consultation', or 'monitoring', but because the substantive policy core of the EES is in need of serious revision.
A prerequisite for that is the active repoliticization of the policy debate throughout the EU, both at the level of high politics and within civil society. This, however, appears exceedingly difficult in the context of the currently fashionable deliberative-processual conception of politics. The latter's claim to a technical (apolitical) rationality is, however, false. As Goetschy (1999: 136) has noted, the EES is 'not an innocent vehicle . . .
[but] implies a [specific] productive and working order within the EU', one that, I have claimed, reifies market impulses. Concealing this fact (by deed or omission) will only impoverish our understanding and limit our capacity to act efficaciously. As Stamatis (2001: 391) has argued recently, democracy cannot be rejuvenated and the problem of unemployment cannot be effectively tackled 'unless democratic deliberation penetrates the . . . forbidden field of capitalist production'.
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